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Automated Reasoning in Social Choice Theory
– Some Remarks ⋆
Siddharth Chatterjee and Arunava Sen
Abstract. Our objective in this note is to comment briefly on the newly emerg-
ing literature on computer-aided proofs in Social Choice Theory. We shall
specifically comment on [16] (henceforth TL) and [4] (henceforth GE). In the
Appendix we provide statements and brief descriptions of the results discussed
in this note.
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Both of the papers on computer-aided proofs in Social Choice Theory that
we have reviewed, TL [16] and GE [4], adopt the same approach. They prove im-
possibility results by reducing a problem of an arbitrary size to a “small” base case
which is then tackled computationally. TL looks at various versions of the classi-
cal Arrovian aggregation problem. It uses conventional induction methods to show
that the existence of non-trivial solutions in the general case implies the existence
of non-trivial solutions in the base case. It then shows that non-trivial solutions
do not exist in the base case thereby establishing an impossibility result. A naive
approach to the base case verification is computationally intractable.1 The idea in
the paper is to encode the properties of an Arrovian Social Welfare Function as a
Constraint Satisfaction Problem (CSP), which can then be solved using standard
algorithmic techniques from computer science. Instead of checking every possible
rule for consistency with the axioms, there is an algorithm that iteratively gener-
ates rules. If at any point the construction in progress meets a contradiction with
any of the axioms applicable in the present stage, the present step and its future
course is abandoned. Then a step is backtracked and the algorithm explores other
⋆ We thank three referees for their insightful comments.
1The smallest interesting case is one with two voters and three alternatives. The number of Arro-
vian aggregators is 366 in this case. A naive approach would be to list each possibility and verify
the Independence of Irrelevant Alternative axiom - this is clearly intractable computationally.
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potential future stages of the present construction. This depth-first search based
technique eliminates redundancies inherent in the naive approach and turns out
to be efficient for practical use in the base case verification.2 The paper uses this
approach to provide proofs of the Arrow, Muller-Satterthwaite and Sen (“Impos-
sibility of a Paretian Liberal”) Theorems in addition to a completely new result.
GE builds on TL and considers the axiomatic set-ranking problem. It proves
a result called the Preservation Theorem that allows the reduction from the gen-
eral case to the base case for a wide class of axiom systems. It addresses the base
case using computational strategies inspired by TL and proves several (84) re-
sults including the Kanai-Peleg Theorem and some new ones. The new results are
generated by considering combinations of standard axioms in this framework.
We will first comment on the significance of the results in these two papers
for social choice theory and then on the general applicability and limitations of
the approach.
The new proofs of existing results are not the most interesting aspects of the
papers. Several proofs already exist - some in fact, are based on induction and
are more insightful than computational proofs. However, some of the new results
are quite striking. Consider, for instance Theorem 5 in TL. The standard proof of
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem ([13]) using the Field Expansion and Group Con-
traction Lemmas makes intensive use of the Weak Pareto (WP) axiom. Wilson’s
Theorem therefore comes as a surprise because it shows that replacing the WP
axiom by a substantially weaker range condition additionally allows only inverse
dictatorship and the constant rule. The proof of Wilson’s theorem typically pro-
ceeds by showing that the range condition in conjunction with the Independence of
Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) axiom implies that the rule is either constant, satis-
fies WP or an inverse WP axiom ([7]). If WP is satisfied, then dictatorship follows
from Arrow’s Theorem; if inverse WP holds, then an “inverse” version of all the
arguments in Arrow’s Theorem can be replicated to yield an inverse dictatorship
theorem. It is clear from the standard proofs that IIA is critical but the role of the
additional axiom (i.e. the range conditions) is unclear. In fact, one may conjecture
that it is important in order to generate a negative result. Theorem 5 makes it
clear that this is not the case. Among the 636 rules, only 94 satisfy IIA. The rules
other than dictatorship and inverse dictatorship are not satisfactory. Specifically,
restrictions of the value of the rule to alternative triples have a range of at most
two and differ from each other by a Kendall distance3 of at most one. As far as
we know, the TL result is the only Arrow-type result in the literature that does
not use an axiom other than IIA. It clearly demonstrates the powerful role of IIA
in reducing possibility results. We believe that this result could not have been
conjectured without computational aids.
A similar comment applies to the new results in GE. The axioms considered
are familiar and well-motivated - their mutual compatibility is an important issue
2The search can be completed with this procedure using a standard processor within a second.
3See the Appendix for a definition.
Automated Reasoning in Social Choice 3
to be resolved. As pointed out by the authors some of the results have escaped the
attention of social choice theorists. For example, [3] claimed to have characterized
max-min rules by a set of four axioms while this paper shows that these axioms
lead to an impossibility.4 Finally, the paper provides direct (or manual) proofs of
some of the new results it discovers.
We believe that automated reasoning can be highly fruitful in addressing a
range of problems in social choice theory. Such reasoning applied to a “small” base
case can be used to verify and generate conjectures. Manually exploring possibil-
ities even for such cases is impossible due to the astronomical number of possi-
bilities. The overall utility of this approach, in our opinion, depends critically on
“how successfully” the general problem can be reduced to a manageable base case.
We note that even if a general reduction in the problem is not feasible, working
out examples with small numbers computationally, is valuable for getting insights
into the general problem.
What are the features of the problem that permit a reduction of the desired
variety? It may be tempting to infer from TL and GE that only impossibility results
are amenable to such reductions. This may be misleading. Virtually all results in
social choice theory are of the following sort: a rule satisfies a certain set of axioms
if and only if it belongs to a certain class. Any such (characterization) result can
be easily reformulated as an impossibility result by asking for the possibility of
a rule belonging to the complement of the characterized class yet satisfying the
same set of axioms. 5 We believe that the key to the reduction issue is therefore,
the “complexity” of the class of rules under consideration. We illustrate this point
with a few examples.
1. Dictatorship-type results are relatively easy to address by this method. It is
natural to ask, for instance, whether a computer-aided proof for the Gibbard-
Satterthwaite Theorem (GST) in strategic voting theory, is possible. In fact
this question has been answered in the affirmative in [15].6 There are, how-
ever, a host of open questions regarding dictatorial rules where this approach
is likely to be useful. We briefly outline one such class of problems, that of
characterizing dictatorial domains. According to GST, every strategy-proof
and unanimous social choice function defined over the complete domains of
strict orderings, is dictatorial.7 A domain of orderings (a non-empty subset
of the complete domain) is dictatorial if every strategy-proof and unanimous
social choice function defined over this domain, is dictatorial. The complete
4[1] had first pointed out that the claim of [3] was incorrect. He had provided an alternative
charcterization without showing that the [3] axioms are inconsistent.
5A referee has pointed out an additional issue that may arise even if reduction to a base case is
feasible - it may not be possible to cast the base case verification as a CSP due to lack of finiteness.
For instance, consider the problem of characterizing the Borda social welfare function. The base
case verification of impossibility would involve checking the existence of certain numbers which
cannot be cast as a CSP. See also footnote 11.
6See [12] for a direct approach along identical lines.
7This is subject to the condition that there are at least three alternatives.
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domain is of course, dictatorial but are there other dictatorial domains? Re-
cent results ([2]) have shown that the class of dictatorial domains is extremely
large - these domains can be very sparse (linear in the number of alterna-
tives). 8 A full characterization of dictatorial domains is not yet in sight. We
believe that a computational approach using TL methods will be helpful in
this regard. For instance, we have verified, using a SAT solver that had been
implemented in SWI-Prolog, that the only dictatorial domain in the case of
three alternatives is the complete domain. 9 These methods remain feasible
for slightly larger problem sizes. There is one aspect of the dictatorial-domains
problem that makes this approach promising - the reduction from the general
case to the case of two voters is well established ([14]). Unfortunately, the
reduction to three alternatives is not valid as the previous comments show.
A more sophisticated approach to the reduction of number of alternatives is
therefore required. Allowing for indifferences in individual preferences sub-
stantially complicates the analysis of dictatorial domains ([11]). 10 This is
another model where computational verification will be invaluable.
2. Several important results in social choice theory are characterizations of
“well-behaved” rules over restricted domains. Perhaps the most prominent
of these are the median-voter (type) rules over single-peaked domains. A
fundamental result was proved in [8] and a large literature has developed on
the subject. Alternatives in this model are a finite number of points on the
real line. A single-peaked preference has a unique peak and preferences de-
cline in both directions away from the peak. A median rule picks the median
peak among the set of voter peaks and (possibly) some fixed or phantom
peaks. Heuristically the median voter rule is a more complex rule than a dic-
tatorship and proving a reduction, especially on the number of alternatives
is a more challenging task.
Another restricted domain problem that admits “well-behaved” rules is
the classical allocation problem with selfish preferences. There are n voters
who have to be allocated at most one of m distinct objects (m ≥ n). Each
voter has a strict ordering over the m objects and is indifferent among all
allocations where she is assigned the same object. A rich class of rules are
strategy-proof in this model (including the well-known “top-trading” cycle)
and a characterization exists ([10]). Nevertheless, a tighter characterization
with fewer axioms is desirable. A reduction argument is difficult in this case
8In this respect, the strategic and aggregative problems in social choice are very different from
each other.
9This result follows from [2]. The complexity of the problem is considerably higher for even
slightly larger problems.
10Indifferences increase the size of the domain. However, size is not the primary complication
introduced by indifferences. When a voter misreports her preferences, the outcome can change
to a new outcome that is indifferent to the original outcome according to both original and
misreported preferences. This possibility cannot occur with strict preferences. As a result, the
analysis with indifference is considerably more complicated.
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as well. Again, computational exercises for small cases may help in forming
conjectures.
3. There are several important classical social choice problems where compu-
tational approaches are unlikely to be of use because they inherently lack
finiteness. These include problems involving randomization ([5]), cardinali-
ties (ranking of sets based on flexibility such as [6]) and divisible commodites
(auction design such as [9]).11
In conclusion, TL and GE are valuable contributions to social choice theory. We
feel that automated reasoning will be a valuable addition to the tool-kit of social
choice theorists.
Appendix
We provide statements of results in social choice that have been referred to in the
paper.
Let A and N = {1, 2, · · · , n} denote the set of candidates and voters, re-
spectively.12 Each voter i ∈ N has a ranking over the set of candidates which is a
strict order Pi over A.
13 The set of all orders over A be denoted by P . The Kendall
distance between two orders is the number of pairwise disagreements between the
two orders. A binary relation L over A generates a choice function if (∀B ⊂ A ,
B 6= ∅)(∃b ∈ B)[bLa ∀a ∈ B]. The set of all such binary relations is denoted by
L. A typical element of Pn is denoted by P ≡ (P1, · · · , Pn) and is referred to as a
preference profile.
An Arrovian Social Welfare Function (ASWF) is a map F : Pn → P . An
ASWF F assigns a social order F (P ) to every preference profile P . A Social Deci-
sion Function (SDF) is a map S : Pn → L. The axioms below pertain to ASWFs
and SDFs.
• The ASWF F satisfies Weak Pareto (WP) if,
(∀P ∈ Pn, ∀a, b ∈ A)[[aPib ∀i ∈ N ] =⇒ [aFˆ (P )b]]
14.
11We recognize that the lack of finiteness becomes an issue in propositional logic and that there
are more expressive logics without this limitation. However, it is not clear to us how these may
be used in the problems cited above.
12All sets are assumed to be finite for the purposes of this article.
13Pi is a strict order over A if it is a binary relation over A satisfying the following properties:
• Completeness : (∀a, b ∈ A)[aPib ∨ bPia]
• Reflexivity : (∀a ∈ A)[aPia]
• Transitivity : (∀a, b, c ∈ A)[[aPib, bPic] =⇒ [aPic]]
• Antisymmetry : (∀a, b ∈ A)[aPib =⇒ ¬bPia].
14Given θ ∈ P, θˆ denotes its strict component, i.e., [aθˆb]⇔ [aθb,¬bθa] , ∀ a, b ∈ A.
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• The ASWF F satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if,
(∀P, P ′ ∈ Pn , ∀a, b ∈ A)[[P |a,b = P
′|a,b]
15 =⇒ [F (P )|a,b = F (P
′)|a,b]].
• The ASWF F is dictatorial if,
(∃i ∈ N)(∀a, b ∈ A , P ∈ Pn)[aPib =⇒ aFˆ (P )b].
voter i is called a dictator in this case.
• The ASWF F is anti-dictatorial if,
(∃i ∈ N)(∀a, b ∈ A , ∀P ∈ Pn)[aPib =⇒ bFˆ (P )a].
• The ASWF F satisfies Non-Imposition (NI) if,
(∀a, b ∈ A)(∃P ∈ Pn)[aF (P )b].
• The SDF S satisfies Unanimity (U) if,
(∀P ∈ Pn, ∀a, b ∈ A)[[aPib ∀i ∈ N ] =⇒ [aSˆ(P )b]].
• Let S be an SDF. An individual i ∈ N is decisive if,
(∃a1, a2 ∈ A , a1 6= a2)(∀P ∈ P
n)[a1Pia2 ⇔ a1S(P )a2].
The SDF S is Liberal (L) if there are at least two decisive individuals.
An ASWF satisfies WP if F respects consensus, i.e. the social order ranks
a over b whenever all voters rank a over b. It satisifies IIA if the social ranking
over any pair of candidates depends only on individual voter rankings over that
pair. It is dictatorial if the social ranking coincides with that of one voter at all
profiles. It is anti-dictatorial if the social ranking is the inverse of the ranking of a
given voter at all profiles. It is NI if all rankings over pairs can arise as the social
ranking at some profile. Unanimity is the counterpart of WP for SDFs. A voter is
decisive if there exists a pair of candidates such that the voters ranking over that
pair coincides with that of the social ranking at all profiles.
Some important results in Arrovian aggregation theory are stated below:
Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem:. Suppose |A| ≥ 3. A ASWF which satisfies IIA
and WP must be dictatorial.
Wilson’s Theorem:. Assume |A| ≥ 3. A ASWF which satisfies IIA and NI must
be null or dictatorial or anti-dictatorial.
Sen’s Theorem on the Impossibility of the Paretian Liberal:. Assume |N | ≥ 2 and
|A| ≥ 3. There is no SDF satisfying U and L.
Strategic social choice theory is concerned with Social Choice Functions
(SCFs) which are maps, f : Pn → A. An SCF picks the “socially optimal” out-
come f(P ) at every profile P . In this model, a voter’s order is private information.
An SCF f is strategy-proof if no voter has an incentive to misreport her true
15Given θ ∈ P and a, b ∈ A, P |a,b denotes the restriction to {a, b} of θ.
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preferences irrespective of the report of the other voters, i.e. truth-telling is a
weakly-dominant strategy for every voter. An SCF is Monotonic if it continues
to pick the same candidate whenever it “improves” in the ranking of all voters.
Finally, an SCF is dictatorial if it always picks the top-ranked candidate of a given
voter at all profiles. These axioms are stated formally below:
• The SCF f satisfies Monotonicity (M) if, ∀P, P ′ ∈ Pn,
[f(P )Pib =⇒ f(P )P
′
i b , ∀i ∈ N , ∀b ∈ A] =⇒ [f(P
′) = f(P )].
• The SCF f is Strategy-Proof (SP) if,
(∀i ∈ N , ∀P ∈ Pn)(∄P ′i ∈ P)[f(P
′
i , P−i)Pif(P
′
i , P−i)].
• The SCF f is Efficient (EFF) if, f(P ) = a =⇒ (∄b)(∀i ∈ N)[bPia].
• Let σ : N → N be a bijection. For all P = (P1, · · · , Pn), P
σ denotes the pro-
file (Pσ(1), · · · , Pσ(n)). The SCF f isAnonymous (ANON) if, (∀σ)(∀P )[f(P ) =
f(P σ)].
• The SCF f is Dictatorial if, (∃i ∈ N)(∀P ∈ Pn)[f(P ) = max(Pi)].
Two important results in strategic social choice are stated below:
Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem. Assume |A| ≥ 3. A SCF which satisfies SP and
is onto must be dictatorial.
Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem. Assume |A| ≥ 3. A SCF which satisfies P and M
must be dictatorial.
A fundamental result for domains of single-peaked preferences is [8] which we
now describe. Let > be a strict order on the set A. We say that Pi is single-peaked
if, for all a, b ∈ A, [a < b ≤ max(Pi)] or [max(Pi) ≤ b < a] =⇒ [bPia].
Let DSP ⊂ P denote the set of all single-peaked preferences. Let B =
{b1, b2, . . . , b2n−1} ⊂ A. Let median (B) = bj if |{bk | bk ≤ bj}| =
n
2 and
|{bk | bj ≤ bk}| =
n
2 . The SCF f is a median voter rule if there exist a1, . . . , an−1
such that f(P ) = median {max(P1),max(P2), . . . ,max(Pn), a1, . . . , an−1} for all
P ∈ [PS ]n.
Moulin’s Theorem. A SCF f : [DSP ]n → A satisfies ANON, EFF and SP iff it is
a median voter.
We now consider the set-ranking problem considered in GE. Let X be a set
of alternatives with a order, >˙ defined on it. Let X be the set of non-empty subsets
of X , and let % be a weak order 16 over X . Let ≻ and ∼ denote the asymmetric
and symmetric components of %, respectively.
16A weak order is one which satisfies all axioms of an order except anti-symmetry.
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The literature on set-ranking considers the the extension of the order >˙ over
X to an order % over X . We briefly state some standard axioms and a basic result
in this context.
• The order % satisfies the Ga¨rdenfors Principle (GF) with respect to >˙ if,
(i) ((∀a ∈ A)x>˙a) =⇒ A ∪ {x} ≻ A , ∀ x ∈ X , A ∈ X and
(ii) ((∀a ∈ A)x<˙a) =⇒ A ∪ {x} ≺ A , ∀ x ∈ X , A ∈ X .
• The order % satisfies Independence (IND) with respect to >˙ if,
A ≻ B =⇒ A ∪ {x} % B ∪ {x} , ∀ A,B ∈ X , x ∈ X \ (A ∪B).
Suppose we add a new element to a set. According to the first part of GF, if
this element is strictly better than all existing elements of the set the resulting set
is strictly better than the initial one. The second part of GF says, if this element
is strictly worse than all existing elements of the set the resulting set is strictly
worse than the initial one. IND says the following: If a set is strictly preferred to
another, then adding an element (not contained in either set) to both does not
reverse the set-ranking.
Kannai-Peleg Theorem. Let |X | ≥ 6. There does not exist any weak order % on
X satisfying the Ga¨rdenfors principle (GF) and Independence (IND).
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